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Objective: To understand the human factor as a threat to the security of trauma patients in the operating room, bringing to the
operating room some important rules already applied in the field of aviation. Methods: The sample included 50 cases of surgical
trauma patients prospectively collected by observers in shifts of 12 hours, for six months in a Level I trauma center in the United
States of America. Information regarding the type of trauma, severity score and mortality were collected, as well as determinants
of distractions / interruptions and the volume of noise in the operating room during surgery. Results: There was an average of
60 interruptions or distractions during surgery, most often triggered by the movement of people in the room. In more severe
patients (ISS> 45), subjected to damage control, the incidence of distractions was even greater. The average noise in the trauma
surgery room was very high, close to the noise of a hair dryer. Conclusion: Interruptions and distractions are frequent and should
be studied by the trauma surgeon to develop prevention strategies and lines of defense to minimize them and reduce their
effects.
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INTRODUCTION
The safety of surgical trauma victims is now a centraltheme in the medical world. Brought to light by the
“Institute of Medicine Report To Err is Human: Building a
Safer Health System”, doctors, nurses and all staff involved
in the management of health care have sought answers
to questions that lead to an unsafe environment for
patients 1,2.
The “error caused by human factors” is the most
common after surgical errors caused by the surgical
technique 3. Substantial data also suggest that at least half
of all surgical complications are avoidable and attributed
to human error 4-6. However, there are no guidelines for
the management of interruptions and distractions, which
are strong factors influencing human errors in the operating
room 7-12.
The primary objective of this study is to understand
the human factor as a threat to patient safety and the surgical
trauma victim and to bring to the operating trauma room
some important rules already applied to the field of aviation.
By creating a suggestion for the management of interruptions
and distractions during trauma surgery, it is expected that
human errors, complications, and therefore mortality rates
be reduced 3,6. As specific objectives expected, there are:
measurement of  the frequency of interruptions and
distractions in the trauma operating room in a single sample;
identify the source of interruptions and distractions in this
environment; assess the intensity of sound in decibels (dB)
in the trauma surgery room.
METHODS
The sample included 50 prospectively studied
trauma victims undergoing surgical treatment for six months
in a Level I trauma center in the United States of America
(USA). Trauma of surgery were classified as: simple
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laparotomy, laparotomy with damage control, exploratory
laparotomy with repair of any intra or extra abdominal
vascular structure, thoracotomy, thoracotomy with damage
control, thoracotomy with vascular repair or a combination
of them. Information regarding the type of injury (blunt or
penetrating), Injury Severity Score (ISS) and mortality rate
was also collected. This study was submitted to the Ethics
Committee under number 08-0613.
Distraction was defined as the behavior observed
when there was diversion of attention during the execution
of a primary task and / or a verbal response to a secondary
task related or not to the activity performed (I.e., responding
to a question from a resident or quickly diverting attention
to see who enters and who leaves the operating room).
The interruption was defined as a distraction resulting in
rupture of the main task in the activity.
To assist in the preparation of the protocol from
the distractions and interruptions, a commercial jet pilot
with 10 years of experience was interviewed and answered
a questionnaire about safety and human error in aviation,
translating the questions to the operating room
environment.
Data collected were used to proceed to the sum
of points, the analysis of the average, as well as other
statistic variables, of each operation, expressing interruptions
and distractions.
The measurement of the operating room noise
was carried out by using a proper instrument (CR 150 -
Noise Meters Inc., USA) of international standards and when
56 decibels (dB) were hit one point was assigned to the
surgical team.
Six observing researchers followed the 12-hour
shifts on that level I trauma center in the U.S. for a period
of six months. Observers were deployed in pairs and
accompanied the team to the operating room and recorded
all observations relevant to the distractions and interruptions
in the trauma operating room according to the variables in
Table 1. Prior to the start of data collection and organization
of the scales of the researchers observers were trained in
groups for a period of one week in the methodology desired
by the authors in order to decrease possible confounding
biases by the researchers.
For data collection a high level of concentration
on the part of observers was required. Therefore, to maintain
quality of the collected data, two researchers observed,
together all surgical procedures of the shifts and their
observations were subsequently compared. The discrepant
cases between observers were excluded. The observation
process of the sample began at the time of placement of
the sterile field and finished with the synthesis of the skin
or peritoneostomy, comprehending only the intraoperative
phase of surgery.
During the observations the researchers remained
isolated in a corner of the operating room and recorded
events that distracted or interrupted the surgical team in
the sterile field. The surgical team had no prior knowledge
of the intention of the authors’ research, co-authors and
collaborators. Observers recorded a brief description and
duration of each distraction or interruption according to the
variables listed in table 1, noting also the start and end
times of the procedures. For each interruption or distraction
one point was recorded, resulting in a sum of points for
each operation.
In parallel with the field work a research in the
medical and aviation internet databases (PubMed,
MEDLINE, Springer Link, Lilacs, Google, the Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and System Share - Asia’s) was carried
out on works related to the theme .
We applied the Fisher test (GraphPad InStat ®
Software, CA - USA) for analysis of statistical values.
RESULTS
In this study the majority of patients were men
(75%) and young (80% between 15 and 45 years old).
Blunt trauma accounted for 70% of lesions, mainly including
automobile accidents and falls.
Table 1 - Sheet of evaluation of interruptions/distractions in trauma surgery.
Evaluation of interruption/distraction in the surgery of trauma
Disruption unrelated to the surgical case (e.g. telephone calls)
Interruption related to surgical case (e.g. lack of material in the operating room)
Distraction not related to the case (ex: conversations about other subjects, background music)
Distraction-related case (ex: quick diversion of attention to observe the scrub nurse preparing material)
Opening doors/Personnel entering and/or leaving the operating room
Phone/Pager ringing
Alarms in the operating room inducing distraction/interruption
Noise level in the operating room > 56 dB
Long surgical procedure (eg: complex vascular repair of more than one hour, head down for more than one hour.
Fatigue (more than two hours of duration)
Interruption/distraction of team member outside of the operating field
Surgery stopped for period longer than 5 minutes (due to the interruption)
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Table 2 shows the types of operation, the value
of N, percentage, mechanism of injury, average time,
average number of interruptions, average events per minute
and mean ISS for each type of operation.
The average total time of operation was 111
minutes (± 46.9), with a maximum of 230 minutes and at
least 39 minutes. The average total interruptions and
distractions ranged from 5 to 192 and reached the average
number of 60.8 (± 38.2). The average total number of
events per minute was 0.62 (± 0.41) with a peak of 1.63
interruptions and distractions in a particular procedure. The
major factors involved in disruptions and distractions were
entering and leaving the operating room (2577 times),
alarms equipment (2334 times), parallel conversation (1821
times), and phone or pager rings (1456).
The operations in critically ill patients (ISS> 45),
with application of the technique of damage control, have
shown high potential for interruptions and distractions of
the surgical team and association with increased mortality
(p = 0.0001). Mortality was 12.5%   and deaths occurred
in less than 24 hours. This subpopulation of patients had a
higher ISS and greater number of interruptions and
distractions per minute on average. It was also observed
that the incidence of interruptions and distractions per minute
is increased in operative acts involving more than one
anatomical cavity (thorax and abdomen), especially when
applying the technique of damage control (p = 0.0001), as
shown in table 2 (1.18 events / minute).
The presence of noise in the operating room was
high. In one surgical procedure we obtained a peak of
130dB, equivalent to the noise of a jet engine (130dB). The
noise ranged between 40dB and 130dB. The average noise
in the trauma operating room reached a level of 85 dB.
DISCUSSION
Distraction is what attracts the eye, the mind or
attention to a different object or, confusingly, it attracts the
subject to a direction other than to the implementation of
the proposed task. Distraction as a human factor cannot,
under any circumstances, be eliminated from the operating
room environment. The human factor is the study of how
people interact with their environments. In the case of
surgery, it is the study of how the performance of surgeons
is influenced by the effects of emotions, the environment
in the operating room, interactions and communications,
etc.13.
Interruptions and distractions are a major threat
facing flight crews and cannot be different for the teams of
trauma surgeons14-20. In the U.S., reports of the Programme
of Action for Aviation   Safety shows that 14% of the crew
include reference to one interruption or distraction21.
Threat is a condition that affects or impedes the
performance of a task or regulatory compliance. Threats
are conditions created by the operating environment, which
can be misleading (eg, omissions, inadvertent actions) 22.
According to the Flight Safety Foundation, the
omission of an action or inadequate action is the most
common causal factor of accidents and incidents 23.
Our study has shown that interruptions and
distractions occur frequently in the  trauma operating room
and, in some cases, more than once per minute. Some
interruptions and distractions can not be avoided, others
can be minimized or eliminated.
In the method developed by the group, a
researcher / observer recorded the distractions and
interruptions of the sterile surgical team during a trauma
surgery. The sample of 50 patients may seem modest, but
it proved to be sufficient to represent the environment of
the operating room during trauma surgery.
For this sample, the overall results showed a high
frequency of distraction and interruption, mainly determined
by the level of involvement of the sterile staff, and reflected
by the high frequency of door opening recorded in the
operating room.
It is important to recognize that the evaluation
method used in our study obviously depends on the ability
Table 2- Summary of statistical analysis of the events observed by surgeries.
Type of N (%) Penetrat ing Average time Average number Average ISS (Average)
Surgery Trauma by surgery of Interruptions / events/min
(min) Distract ions
LE 21 (42%) 4 116 58 0.42 42
LE + CD 9 (18%) 2 114 66 0.92 48
LE + CD + T 6 (12%) 3 89 46 1.18 51
LE + RV 6 (12%) 2 103 84 0.4 49
LE + RV + T 1 (5%) 0 189 38 0.83 36
LE + T 4 (8%) 3 104 59 0.56 51
T 2 (4%) 1 123 70 0.39 47
T + RV 1 (5%) 0 89 23 0.53 17
LE: Exploratory Laparotomy, CD: Damage Control, RV: Vascular Repair, T: Thoracotomy.
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of the observer to interpret the events of distraction or
interruption and this can vary from person to person,
resulting in a potential bias. Observers may be biased in
identifying some distractions rather than others, ; to control
this behavior, however, is extremely difficult, even after
the exhaustion of the training method. It would take further
research to test the influence of an observer on the sample
studied.
During evaluation of the results we observed
that despite some provocative events of distraction are
very frequent, such as side conversations and cell phone
ringtones, they did not exercise much influence (causing
interruptions) on the surgical team in the operative field.
However, equipment failure or a lack of necessary
materials, although less common, ended up generating a
high incidence of interruptions, sometimes up to thirty
minutes.
The noise exceeded acceptable limits in most
cases. For satisfactory speech intelligibility, there must be a
sound frequency of 10 dB difference between the ambient
noise and noise from the voice (ISO 9921). The pronounced
voice effort reaches 66dB under normal conditions 24. In
this line, it has been determined that the acceptable noise
level in the operating room should be 56dB. The average
total noise in the trauma room was well beyond, reaching
85dB. Our results were consistent with other studies showing
high levels of noise in the operating room 14-16. High levels
of noise in the background have been described as negative
factors in determining communication and cognition of the
surgical team, and this study showed an association with
increased mortality in trauma complex operations 16,17.
Interruptions and distractions in the cockpit of
the plane can be subtle or momentary, but all can be harmful
to the crew. Interruptions or distractions usually result from
three main causes, which could be applied directly to the
trauma surgery 3,25-29: communications (eg anesthesiologist
informing or inquiring about the status of the patient,
resident receiving the instructions in the next surgical step
or a nurse entering or leaving the room frequently), Head-
down activity (eg long period of time with he head down in
a difficult vascular anastomosis), responding to an abnormal
condition or an unexpected situation (eg, malfunctioning
surgical devices, uncontrolled bleeding).
Other contributing factors that are often cited
when discussing the topic interruption and distraction:
ergonomics, noise levels, proficiency in the local language,
fatigue and inadequate infrastructure. The failure of an
equipment, for example, demonstrating poor organization
of the infrastructure, may turn a routine procedure into a
challenging event 28,29.
The following aspects should be considered to
develop prevention strategies and lines of defense to
mitigate the effects of interruptions and distractions in the
trauma operating room: recognize potential sources of
interruptions and distractions; understand their effects on
the surgical plan; reduce the interruptions and distractions;
and develop prevention strategies and lines of defense to
minimize their risk of interruptions and distractions.
The main effect of interruptions or distractions is
to break the continuous flow of surgical activities (example:
stop actions or communications), which include standard
operating procedures (surgical technique), communication
(listening, processing, responding) and problem-solving
activities (example: bleeding control, contamination control,
proper adjustment of coagulation).
The diverted attention resulting from the
interruption / distraction usually leaves the crew with the
feeling that something is being done incorrectly or that tasks
are being performed incompletely 8,27-28.
When confronted with demands of concurrent
tasks, natural human limitations result in the execution of
one task over another, which can potentially lead to error.
Unless mitigated by proper techniques,
disturbances and lack of attention in the context of trauma
surgery can result in: lack of focus on the most important
issues (eg, repair of the bowel prior to control bleeding or
to repair the diaphragm in an unstable patient who needs
urgent care), lack of information or misinterpretation of
the surgeon or anesthesiologist (possibly resulting in a delay
in the decision to apply damage control); omission of a
corrective action of, or even missing, an abnormal condition;
experiencing an overload of tasks.
In the field of aviation, numerous reports have
been generated as a result of interruptions and distractions,
including some that could compromise flight safety.
(Examples: wrong configuration of the aircraft for takeoff,
late retraction of the landing gear, premature flaps
retraction, failure to start the anti-ice engine when necessary,
failure in reprogramming the altimeter, failure to apply the
parking brake on arrival at the gate) 7,27,29.
Because some interruptions and distractions can
be subtle and / or insidious, the first priority is to recognize
and identify the disturbance. The second priority is to restore
the situational awareness, as follows:
Identify: What was I doing?
Remember: Where I was interrupted?
Decide: What decisions or actions should I take
to return to the primary task?
In the event of interruption of the primary task,
the following decisions must be taken: prioritize actions to
save the life of the patient, plan the actions (some actions
may be postponed until the patient’s condition becomes
stable); check the postponed action (ensure that the action
was later duly fulfilled).
The concept of “Sterile Cockpit” reflects the
requirement of the Aviation Safety Agency of the United
States (U.S. FAR - Part 121, 542): “No command pilot,
and no flight crew member may allow any other activity
during a critical phase of the flight, which may confuse
any flight crew member from the performance of his/her
duties or to interfere in any way in the performance of
their duties.”
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For the purposes of this requirement, the word
“activity” includes: “... engaging in nonessential
conversations within the cockpit and nonessential
communications between the cockpit and cabin crews ...”.
The term “critical phases of flight” includes: “... all ground
operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing and all flight
operations below 10,000 feet, except cruise flight.”
The “sterile cockpit rule” can be applied in critical
moments of trauma surgery, such as damage control or
when the patient is unstable. Data based on evidence from
the field of aviation show that adherence to the “sterile
cockpit rule” can greatly reduce interruptions and
distractions 27. The “sterile cockpit rule” should be applied
with common sense, so as not to break the line of
communication between the surgical team,
anesthesiologists, nurses and scrub nurse.
It is recognized in aviation that distraction and
inefficient management of concurrent tasks may
compromise security. The work interrupted in the cockpit
may lead pilots to quickly forget the planned activities and
lead to error or deviation in the standard protocols 28,29.
Rules and conditions for safe functioning of the
trauma operating room exist, but are mainly geared toward
the concept of sterility, nursing protocols, as scores of
instruments, bandages and surgical anesthesia protocols.
There are no explicit rules to control interference during an
operation.
The institution of courses similar to the Crew
Resource Management (CRM) from aviation and applied
to medicine changed behavior with respect to patients’
safety with the acceptance of perioperative checklists and
an increase in self-assessment, including the identification
of more unsafe conditions. However, it is difficult to isolate
the effect of the CRM program on the overall performance
and patient safety 28,29. Human factors (errors) are still
identified as a common problem that brings its own
characteristics and consequences, including increased
morbidity and mortality 3,6,11,30.
Numerous scientific papers demonstrating the
application of CRM training is available in the medical
literature, although CRM training is focused on leadership,
personnel management and management error. Human
factors (distractions), specifically, are usually presented with
an overview, sometimes underestimating their influence in
the event of errors 8,19,31.
The need to direct our attention to distractions
and interruptions that occur in the trauma operating
room of is imminent. What in the past proved to be a
harmless behavior is now demonstrating that has
negative effects on the prognosis and patient safety.
However, little attention and few studies are devoted
to the subject. It became important to know that there
are errors, but more important than knowing how to
avoid them is to be prepared, to manage and to recover
from the error.
Human factors should be considered in the
medical field as they are in aviation. Stress, fatigue,
distractions, interruptions, personal problems, interpretation,
communication, misjudgment and inattention to detail are
some powerful examples of influence to error 32.
Finally, one can conclude that the interruptions
and distractions are a reality and should be studied by the
trauma surgeon; prevention strategies and lines of defense
must be designed to minimize interruptions and distractions
and reduce its effect;, recovery techniques, such as
identifying, asking, deciding, acting, prioritizing, planning
and checking, should be considered when managing
interruptions and / or distractions.
R E S U M O
Objetivo: Compreender o fator humano como ameaça à segurança do paciente vítima de trauma no centro cirúrgico, traduzindo
para a sala de operação algumas regras importantes já aplicadas no campo da aviação. Métodos: A amostra incluiu 50 casos de
cirurgia de trauma coletados prospectivamente por observadores em plantões de 12 horas, ,durante seis meses, em um centro de
trauma nível I nos Estados Unidos da América. Informações quanto ao tipo de trauma, escore de gravidade e mortalidade foram
coletadas, assim como, determinantes de distrações/interrupções e o volume de ruídos na sala de cirurgia durante o ato cirúrgico.
Resultados: Ocorreram, em média, 60 interrupções ou distrações durante o ato cirúrgico, na maioria das vezes desencadeado pelo
movimento de pessoas na sala. Em pacientes mais graves (ISS > 45), submetidos ao controle de danos, a incidência de distrações foi
ainda maior. A média de ruídos na sala de cirurgia do trauma foi muito elevada, com barulho próximo ao de um secador de cabelos.
Conclusão: Interrupções e distrações são frequentes e devem ser estudadas pelo cirurgião do trauma a fim de desenvolver
estratégias de prevenção e linhas de defesa para minimizá-las e reduzir seus efeitos.
Descritores: Erros médicos. Medidas de segurança. Pacientes. Centro cirúrgico hospitalar.
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